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INTRODUCTION 
The different approaches to privacy in the United States and 
the European Union are deeply rooted in traditions much broader 
than the concept of privacy, such as the role of government in 
private life, the role of the press, and the freedoms that are afforded 
to the media generally.1  This Comment explores those different 
approaches, utilizing the facts of Case C-101/01 Criminal 
Proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist,2 a Swedish case sent to the 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) that should serve as a warning 
to legislators in the United States concerned with protecting 
privacy.  In Lindqvist, the scope, definition, meaning, and 
 
 1 Cf. Arnulf S. Gubitz, The U.S. Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 in 
Conflict with the E.U. Data Protection Laws: How Much Access to Airline Passenger 
Data Does the United States Need to Combat Terrorism?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 431, 
446–47 (2005) (discussing the United States’ broad view of privacy as compared to the 
European Union’s restrictive view). 
 2 Judgment of the Court of 6 November 2003 in Case C-101/01 (Reference for a 
preliminary ruling from the Göta hovrätt): Bodil Lindqvist, OJ 2004 C7/3 [hereinafter 
Lindqvist Judgment]. 
FLORA 11/21/2005  1:11 PM 
1206 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XV 
 
application of the European Union’s Data Protection Directive 
(“Data Protection Directive,” “Directive,” “Directive 95/46”)3 was 
tested for the first time.4  The Data Protection Directive affects 
United States companies involved in data transfer5 in the European 
Union.6  The U.S. Department of Commerce has established Safe 
Harbor provisions  to help companies discern the requirements for 
protection of European Union residents’ data in non-E.U. 
countries.7 
Part I of this Comment provides a history of the Data 
Protection Directive and associated European Union regulation 
regarding data privacy.  Part I also discusses the definitions in the 
Data Protection Directive and the issues of third country transfer 
and “adequate” protection.  Part I concludes with a discussion of 
the United States’ Safe Harbor guidelines, which address the 
Directive’s third country elements for companies that participate. 
Part II explains the European Court of Justice’s decision in 
Lindqvist, the case of a Swedish woman who was accused and 
found guilty of violating the Data Protection Directive.  This Part 
will illustrate the interplay between the European Court of 
Justice’s decision, the text of the Data Protection Directive and the 
 
 3 Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 
O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive]. 
 4 JuNelle Harris, Beyond Fair Use: Expanding Copyright Misuse to Protect Digital 
Free Speech, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 83, 120 n.235 (2004) (“Lindqvist . . . was the 
first case interpreting a national enactment of the European Union’s Data Protection 
Directive.”). 
 5 “Data transfer” is not defined within the text of the European Union’s Data 
Protection Directive. See discussion infra Part II.A.5.  However, throughout the body of 
the Directive, transfer is used in discussions regarding the moving of information from 
one location to another. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International 
Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1317, 1336 (2000).  
Processing, storing, collecting, and accessing all seem to be activities related to data 
transfer. Id. at 1336. 
 6 See, e.g., Marsha Cope Huie, Stephen F. Laribee, and Stephen D. Hogan, The Right 
to Privacy in Personal Data: The EU Prods the U.S. and Controversy Continues, 9 
TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 391, 396.  See also Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, at 
Chapter IV. 
 7 See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Overview, available at 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_overview.html (last visited May 5, 2005) 
[hereinafter Safe Harbor Overview]; U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Documents, 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/sh_documents.html (last visited May 5, 2005). 
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comments filed with the Court regarding the Lindqvist controversy.  
Further, Part II addresses the limited guidance that multinational 
corporations and others concerned with data transfer in the 
European Union can take away from the decision and its 
commentary regarding the definition of “processing” and 
“transfer”; what activities might fall under exceptions of the 
Directive; and what the Court considers information regarding 
health. 
Part III analyzes the European Court of Justice’s reading of the 
Data Protection Directive in the Lindqvist case, showing that the 
Court offered less delineation and clarity than observers hoped.  It 
argues that true privacy protection is not ensured by penalizing 
private citizens such as Lindqvist, but rather by increased 
awareness on the part of consumers and companies of both the 
massive quantities of data stored and the transfer of that data.  Part 
III concludes that the Lindqvist decision should be treated as a 
warning to eager politicians in the United States who see an 
overarching law as the solution to privacy concerns. 
I. EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES: PRIVACY TRADITIONS  
ROOTED IN DISTINCT HISTORIES 
The United States relies on homegrown features such as “the 
press, plaintiffs’ bar and watchdog groups”8 for protection of data 
privacy, a scheme that highlights United States citizens’ 
“continuing . . . ambivalence about state power.”9  The contrasting 
European view of privacy as a human right—and hence of “data 
protection as a fundamental human right”—aids in understanding 
both the Data Protection Directive and attitudes in the European 
Union towards transgressions that violate the privacy of 
individuals.10  In response to the Data Protection Directive, the 
United States Department of Commerce negotiated the U.S.-EU 
 
 8 GLOBAL PRIVACY AND SECURITY LAW: SPECIAL REPORT PREPARED FOR THE 97TH 
ANNUAL MEETING AND CONFERENCE OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIANS 
S5 (BNA 2004). 
 9 PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 211 (1996). 
 10 See CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS 16 
(2003). 
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Safe Harbor Data Privacy Accord, which sets standards for 
companies wishing to transfer data out of Europe.11  Companies 
that undergo Safe Harbor certification are considered under the 
agreement to have “adequate” safeguards in place.12  Unlike the 
U.S. approach, national laws addressing privacy were passed in 
European countries by the early 1990s,13 with some dating back to 
the 1970s.14  These regulations generally were broad in nature, 
required registration with governmental offices, and were applied 
regardless of the data type.15 
A. The European Union 
Though much attention has been focused recently on the 
differences in privacy protection approaches and regulation with 
the advent of the Internet in Europe, concerns over other countries’ 
inadequate treatment of personal information predate the ubiquity 
of the Internet.16  Norway, Austria, Germany, Sweden, France and 
the United Kingdom all had blocked or prohibited data flows to at 
least one other country by 1990.17  In Germany, the state of Hessen 
passed the first data protection law in 1970 amid fears of a return 
of the misuses of personal data that took place when the Nazis used 
early data sorting devices to establish Jewish ancestry.18  Concerns 
about German history repeating itself led to the formation of 
governmental privacy protection agencies in all the states.  By 
 
 11 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Welcome to the Safe Harbor, at 
http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/ (last visited May 5, 2005) [hereinafter Welcome to the 
Safe Harbor].  See also discussion infra Part I.B. 
 12 Id. 
 13 PETER P. SWIRE & ROBERT E. LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA FLOWS, 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 23 (1998). 
 14 HARRY HENDERSON, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 36 (1999) (noting that 
France, Germany, and Great Britain all enacted privacy regulations in the 1970s). 
 15 SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 13, at 23 (quoting FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE 
INFORMATION AGE 32–33 (1997)). 
 16 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier 
for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 199 n.16 (1992). 
 17 Id. 
 18 David Scheer, For Your Eyes Only: Europe’s New High-Tech Role: Playing Privacy 
Cop to the World, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2003, at A1. 
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1995, Germany, along with other countries, called on the European 
Commission for regulation.19 
1. The European Data Protection Directive 
For purposes of electronic transfers of private information, the 
primary modern EU rule is the European Data Protection 
Directive, formally adopted on October 24, 1995, and expected to 
be implemented by the Member states within three years.20  The 
Data Protection Directive was created to harmonize data protection 
law throughout the EU.21  It was an outgrowth of the Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data,22 which resulted in “Guidelines on 
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow of Personal 
 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id.; EDIRECTIVES: GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW ON E-COMMERCE 121 (Arno R. 
Lodder & Henrik W.K. Kaspersen eds., 2002) [hereinafter EU E-COMMERCE LAW].  In 
January 2000, the European Commission took legal action against member states 
(France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, and Ireland) that did not pass national 
laws to incorporate the data protection elements of the Directive as required. See Press 
Release, European Union, Data Protection: Commission Takes Five Member states to 
Court (Jan. 11, 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/ 
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/00/10&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&g
uiLanguage=en; see also Status of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/implementation_en.htm (last visited May 5, 2005) 
(providing a current listing of the relevant laws of the member states and their status). 
 21 Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, ¶¶ 7–8, at 31–32. 
Whereas the difference in levels of protection of the rights and freedoms of 
individuals, notably the right to privacy, with regard to the processing of 
personal data afforded in the Member states  may prevent the transmission of 
such data from the territory of one Member state to that of  another Member 
state; whereas this difference may therefore constitute an obstacle to the pursuit 
of a number of economic activities at Community level, distort competition and 
impede authorities  in the discharge of their responsibilities under Community 
law; whereas this difference in levels of protection is due to the existence of a 
wide variety of national laws, regulations and administrative  provisions. 
Id. ¶ 7, at 31–32. 
 22 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, ETS No. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981), available at http://conventions.coe.int/ 
Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/108.htm; see also EU E-COMMERCE LAW, supra note 20, at 
119–20. 
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Data.”23  Those guidelines went into effect on September 23, 
1980.24  However, new technologies eroded the protections of 
those guidelines, and though the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development is working on a more modern 
treatment, the European Union developed the Data Protection 
Directive as a framework for data protection that covered the 
European Union nations.25 
A directive, contrasted with a regulation, is by definition an 
“instruction” to European Union Member states to codify the 
directive’s requirements within their national laws in the 
designated timeframe.26  An important aspect of the Data 
Protection Directive is the obligation that each member state 
establish a “public authority” or agency to administer the 
Directive’s requirements.27 
The Data Protection Directive, like most European Union 
regulation, focuses on private sector data transfers—governmental 
uses and transfers of data are beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.28  
In deference, Article 13 of the Data Protection Directive offers 
exemptions to data involved in national security or public security; 
crime prevention, criminal investigation, detection or prosecution; 
the economic or financial interest of member states or the EU; “the 
exercise of official authority” in regards to the previous; and the 
protection of the individual or of “rights and freedoms of others.”29 
The source of privacy protection from which the Data 
Protection Directive emanates is the Charter of Fundamental 
 
 23 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Guidelines on 
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (adopted Sept. 23, 
1980), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_ 
1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited May 5, 2005). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See EU E-COMMERCE LAW, supra note 20, at 119–20. 
 26 Simon Smith, European Data Privacy Rights Not So Scary After All, E-COMMERCE 
L. & STRATEGY, Mar. 13, 2003, at 3. 
 27 Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 28, at 47; see also KUNER, supra note 
10, at 13–16 (discussing the breadth of duties of the agencies). 
 28 SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 13, at 7. 
 29 Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, arts. 13(1)(a)–(g), at 42.  The Directive does 
not limit what member states may include within their criminal codes. JOEL R. 
REIDENBERG & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, ON-LINE SERVICES AND DATA PROTECTION AND 
PRIVACY: REGULATORY RESPONSES 141–42 (1998). 
FLORA 11/21/2005  1:11 PM 
2005] VIOLATION OF THE E.U. DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE 1211 
 
Rights of the European Union’s30 Article 8, which makes the 
protection of personal data an explicit right held by the individual 
and lays out a bar for legitimate need to access the data.31  To put 
the protection of Article 8 into context, it is important to note that 
the first article discusses the inviolability of human dignity.32  The 
subsequent Articles, 2–7, are titled, respectively, Right to Life, 
Right to the Integrity of the Person, Prohibition of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Prohibition of 
Slavery and Forced Labour, Right to Liberty and Security, and 
Respect for Private and Family Life.33  As part of this framework, 
the Data Protection Directive attempts to find balance between 
privacy and the desires for economic growth, recognizing that in a 
strong EU marketplace, “the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital . . . require[s] not only that personal data 
should be able to flow freely from one member state to another, 
but also that the fundamental rights of individuals should be 
safeguarded.”34 
2. Other Related EU Regulations 
Apart from the Data Protection Directive, the topic of data 
protection was also addressed in the Telecommunications Data 
Protection Directive35 and the Directive on Electronic 
 
 30 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. 
 31 Protection of personal data[:] 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of 
the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down 
by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected 
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority. 
Id. art. 8, at 10. 
 32 Id. art. 1, at 9. 
 33 Id. arts. 2–7, at 9–10. 
 34 Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, ¶ 3, at 31. 
 35 Council Directive 97/66/EC of 15 December 1997 Concerning the Processing of 
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications Sector, 1998 O.J. 
(L 24) 1. 
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Commerce.36  The Telecommunications Data Protection Directive 
applied the principles of the Data Protection Directive to the 
telecommunications sector, but its limitations37 caused its repeal 
and replacement by Directive 2002/58/EC on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications (“Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications”).38  The Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications covers communication on public networks and 
contains security and confidentiality provisions that relate to 
information being transferred over electronic networks within the 
EU.39  In addition, the Directive also delimits how cookies may be 
set on computers, restricts how mobile phone location information 
can be used and bans SPAM within the EU.40  Notwithstanding 
these restrictions, the Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications contains language suggesting its support of 
international commerce, communication, and the inevitable growth 
of electronic transmissions: “[t]he successful cross-border 
development of these services is partly dependent on the 
confidence of users that their privacy will not be at risk.”41 
Meanwhile, the Directive on Electronic Commerce combines 
consumer protection elements with the encouragement of business, 
 
 36 Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of 
Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market 
(Directive on Electronic Commerce), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter Directive on 
Electronic Commerce].  For more information on these directives and their histories, see 
EU E-COMMERCE LAW, supra note 20, at 67–93, 119–45; Smith, supra note 26. 
 37 See generally Abu Bakar Munir and Siti Hajar Mohd Yasin, Retention of 
Communications Data: A Bumpy Road Ahead, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
731, 732-35 (2004).  “[The Telecommunications Privacy Directive] imposed wide-
ranging obligations on carriers and service providers to ensure the privacy of users’ 
communications, including Internet-related activities.  It covered areas that, until then, 
had fallen between the cracks of data protection laws.”  The Directive erred on the side of 
privacy for individuals, but after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in New York member 
countries expressed concern that the Directive could limit law enforcement agencies’ 
access to suspect’s communication records.  Id. at 732. 
 38 Council Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of 
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector 
(Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications), ¶ 4, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37 
[hereinafter Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications]. 
 39 See generally id.; New European Privacy Rules Go into Effect, COMPUTER & 
INTERNET LAW., Jan. 2004, at 21. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, supra note 38, ¶ 5, at 37. 
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but steers clear of discussions of personal data protection.42  It 
covers business-to-business and business-to-consumer 
commerce.43  Like the Data Protection Directive, it discusses the 
potential abuses by Internet service providers and other possible 
intermediaries in the transmission of data.44  In Article 16, the 
Directive on Electronic Commerce encourages the formation of 
self-regulating trade associations “representing consumers in the 
drafting and implementation of codes of conduct affecting their 
interests.”45 
These directives act in consort with the Data Protection 
Directive.46  Detailed treatment of the Data Protection Directive, 
which has seventy-two recitals and thirty-four articles, is beyond 
the scope of this Comment.47 
3. Defintions in the Data Protection Directive 
The definitions set out in the Data Protection Directive are 
crucial to understanding the Lindqvist decision and the United 
States’ Safe Harbor provisions.  The definitions offer insight into 
the Directive’s scope and the ambiguities faced by those trying to 
follow its tenets. 
Personal data comprises “any information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person.”48  The concept of 
identifiable includes “reference to an identification number or to 
one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, 
 
 42 See TERRY R. BRODERICK, REGULATION OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 76–77 (2000) (explaining how the Directive regulates certain 
“economic activities,” but does not apply to “protection of personal data”). 
 43 Simon G. Zinger, Current Issues in eCommerce: Regulation of Electronic Commerce 
in Europe: A Corporate Counsel Guide, 19 ACCA Docket 40, 47 (2001). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra note 36, art. 16(2), at 14. 
 46 See generally EU E-COMMERCE LAW, supra note 20. 
 47 See generally Data Protection Directive, supra note 3.  For a discussion of the 
Directive that predates the agreements between the EU and the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, see Domingo R. Tan, Comment, Personal Privacy in the Information Age: 
Comparison of Internet Data Protection Regulations in the United States and the 
European Union, 21 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 661 (1999).  For a more detailed 
treatment, see EU E-COMMERCE LAW, supra note 20, at 119–20. 
 48 Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(a), at 38. 
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economic, cultural or social identity.”49  Article 2 of the Data 
Protection Directive contains one of the elements of the Directive 
that has raised great concern; the definition of processing, which: 
shall mean any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic 
means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise 
making available, alignment or combination, blocking, 
erasure or destruction.50 
One commentator wrote that “[i]t is pretty clear that just about 
anything that could conceivably be done with data is covered by 
the term processing.”51  Another observed that “processing,” is so 
broad that “[t]he Directive could have far-reaching effects on 
business practices within the United States and other ‘third 
countries.’”52  The multinational corporation, with large amounts 
of personal data stored in a variety of locations about both 
employees and customers, the e-commerce portal of any size 
whose products appeal to people throughout the world and the 
company using other companies in other countries to process data 
or payment or host the storage of data are all enterprises with 
activities and data covered by the Data Privacy Directive if that 
data refers to a European Union resident.53  The risks could be high  
for large companies with decentralized or outsourced data 
collection and storage.54  As companies attempt to reduce 
information technology costs by outsourcing offshore or using 
offsite storage, they can run into issues with the Directive.55 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. art. 2(b), at 38. 
 51 Smith, supra note 26. 
 52 SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 13, at 3. 
 53 Cf. Scheer, supra note 18.  For example, General Motors’ locations could not publish 
and distribute telephone books with European employee office numbers, as even office 
numbers are considered personal information, without the consent of the employees and 
adherence to other regulations. Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Cf id.  Some companies are following the European lead, the “gold standard,” 
according to DuPont’s corporate counsel.  DuPont has been seeking signatures on 
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4. The Issues of Third Country Transfers and “Adequate” 
Protections 
The regulations concerning third country data transfers are 
important for the international economy.56  Article 25 covers the 
transfer to third countries: “The Member states shall provide that 
the transfer to a third country of personal data which are 
undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer 
may take place only if . . . the third country in question ensures an 
adequate level of protection.”57  Adequacy “shall be assessed in 
the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer 
operation or set of data transfer operations,” and the type and use 
of the data.58  In addition, 
particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the 
data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing 
operation or operations, the country of origin and country 
of final destination, the rules of law, both general and 
sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the 
professional rules and security measures which are 
complied with in that country.59 
The many attributes which must be considered and the ongoing 
evolution of the meaning of “adequacy” in the European Union, as 
well as the interplay of country-by-country interpretation of Data 
Protection Directive, set the stage for some short-term 
uncertainty.60 
B. The United States’ Response to the Data Protection Directive: 
Safe Harbor 
 
consent forms from employees and contracts with partners that state they will protect data 
they encounter. Id. 
 56 See Reidenberg, supra note 5, at 1350–51. 
 57 Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 25(1), at 45 (emphasis added). 
 58 Id. art. 25(2), at 45.  An interpretation of the meaning of transfer was one of the 
things to come out of the Lindqvist decision. See discussion infra Part III. 
 59 Id. art. 25(2), at 45. 
 60 Reidenberg, supra note 5, at 1351. 
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The United States does not have a singular, cohesive national 
law on electronic privacy protection61 and comes from a tradition 
of addressing individual needs rather than general principles for 
privacy regulations.62  This section will address how the U.S. 
responded to the European Union’s Data Protection Directive, by 
negotiating with E.U. regulators to establish the Safe Harbor 
guidelines to satisfy the Directive.63 
With the segregated nature of the U.S.’ treatment of data 
privacy, the U.S. did not meet the EU Data Protection Directive’s 
requirement that any country where Member Country residents’ 
data would be transferred must have “adequate” national law 
protection.64  In response, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
negotiated the Safe Harbor principles with the EU authorities.65  
 
 61 See id. at 1333, 1335. 
 62 See id. at 1345–46; see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Data Protection Law and the 
European Union’s Directive: The Challenge for the United States, Setting Standards for 
Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500 (1995) 
(“Despite the growth of the Information Society, the United States has resisted all calls 
for omnibus or comprehensive legal rules for fair information practice in the private 
sector.  Legal rules have developed on an ad hoc, targeted basis, while industry has 
elaborated voluntary norms and practices for particular problems.”); Scheer, supra note 
18. 
 63 Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 7. 
 64 See Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, ¶¶ 56–57, at 36–37. 
1.  The Member states shall provide that the transfer to a third country of 
personal data which are undergoing processing or are intended for processing 
after transfer may take place only if, without prejudice to compliance with the 
national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, 
the third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection. 
6.  The Commission may find, in accordance with the procedure referred to in 
Article 31(2), that a third country ensures an adequate level of protection within 
the meaning of paragraph 2 of this Article, by reason of its domestic law or of 
the international commitments it has entered into, particularly upon conclusion 
of the negotiations referred to in paragraph 5, for the protection of the private 
lives and basic freedoms and rights of individuals. 
Id. art. 25(1) & (6), at 45–46. 
 65 Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 7. 
The safe harbor—approved by the EU in 2000—is an important way for U.S. 
companies to avoid experiencing interruptions in their business dealings with 
the EU or facing prosecution by  European authorities under European privacy 
laws.  Certifying to the safe harbor will assure that EU organizations know that 
your company provides “adequate” privacy protection, as defined by the 
Directive. 
Id. 
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The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Data Privacy Accord was finalized in 
the summer of 2000.66  “Certifying” to the Safe Harbor covers 
notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data integrity, access, and 
means of enforcement and recourse.  Safe Harbor provisions 
require that the organization: 
(1) informs users what information it collects and why, 
(2) lets the user opt out (and in some instances requires that 
the user opts in), 
(3) addresses the passing along to another organization or 
agent of the data, 
(4) permits the information to be accessible by the 
individual for correction or deletion, 
(5) “take[s] reasonable precaution” in regard to protecting 
data from “loss, misuse and unauthorized access, 
disclosure, alteration and destruction,” 
(6) ensures that data collection should be compatible with 
the use and takes “reasonable steps” regarding its reliability 
and accuracy, and 
(7) be subject to enforcement and recourse methods.67 
The negotiated Safe Harbor provisions ensure that (1) if a U.S. 
firm is charged with a violation of EU privacy laws, then all 
member states will be bound by the European Commission’s 
finding of “adequacy” of data protection, (2) requirements of pre-
approval for data transfer will be granted or waived, and (3) claims 
brought by EU citizens will generally be heard in the United 
States.68  The concept of “adequacy” was directly addressed in 
Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, which affirms that the United 
States’ Safe Harbor principles may meet the bar for adequate 
 
 66 Welcome to the Safe Harbor, supra note 11. 
 67 See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (July 21, 2000), 
available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SHPRINCIPLESFINAL.htm (last visited 
May 5, 2005). 
 68 Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 7. 
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protection.69  The distinction between the United States’ and 
European Union’s treatment of data protection has been called the 
difference between “market mechanisms” and “state regulation.”70  
The Lindqvist case illustrates those distinctions clearly and 
demonstrates state regulation at the extreme. 
II. ISSUES RAISED IN THE BODIL LINDQVIST CASE AND  
SUBSEQUENT DECISION 
The first ruling interpreting the EU Data Protection Directive 
came from a case originating in Sweden that tested the balance 
between privacy and the power of the free Internet.71  Case C-
101/01 Criminal Proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist  arose after 
Lindqvist, who was a church maintenance worker and volunteer, 
took a computer class72 and created some web pages with a variety 
of information about herself, her husband, and eighteen other 
church volunteers without their permission.73  The web pages, 
created in late 1998, “included some full names, telephone 
numbers and references to hobbies and jobs held by her 
 
 69 Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by 
the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by 
the US Department of Commerce, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7. 
 70 See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and 
International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 
1, 6 (2000). 
 71 Global Internet’s Fragmentation by Govts., Innovation Debated, WARREN’S WASH. 
INTERNET DAILY, Aug. 18, 2004.  “‘It is for the national authorities and courts responsible 
for applying the national legislation implementing the directive to ensure a fair balance 
between the rights and interests in question, including those fundamental rights,’ such as 
free expression.” Id. (citing Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2). 
 72 Peter Hitchens, The Superstar Footballer, A Swedish Lady’s Injured Foot . . . And a 
Sinister Threat to Our Freedom, THE MAIL ON SUNDAY (London), Jan. 11, 2004, at 54. 
 73 See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶¶ 12–14 (noting that Lindqvist originally set 
up her web page, which was linked to the Church’s website, to provide information for 
parishioners making Confirmation); Jacqueline Klosek, European Court Establishes 
Broad Interpretation of Data Privacy Law, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2004; 
see also Dan Tench, You Can’t Print That, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 5, 2004, at 10 
(noting, though, that only sixteen other parishioners were included on the website). 
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colleagues,”74 as well as information about one person’s foot 
injury.75  The pages also had information about preparing to take 
Communion at the church.76 
Lindqvist was asked to remove the pages, which accounts 
describe as “gossipy,”77 and written in a “mildly humorous 
manner.”78  She did so, but the Swedish data protection authorities 
nevertheless filed a complaint against her.79  Lindqvist was 
charged with having: 
[1] processed personal data by automatic means without 
giving prior written notification to the 
Datainspektionen . . .; [2] processed sensitive personal data 
(injured foot and half-time on medical grounds) without 
authorisation . . .; [and] [3] transferred processed personal 
data to a third country without authorization. . . .80 
Lindqvist was found guilty, fined approximately $500 and 
required to contribute to a fund for crime victims.81  Part II will 
review the questions sent to the European Court of Justice, and 
then consider whether the decision gives guidance, concluding 
with a discussion of the meaning of “transfer” as suggested in the 
case. 
A. The Questions the Swedish Court Sent to the European Court 
of Justice.   
 Bodil Linqvist agreed with the facts of the case during her trial 
in the district court (the Eksjö tingsrätt), but disputed her guilt and 
 
 74 Hitchens, supra note 72; see also Andre Fiebig, The First ECJ Interpretation of the 
Data Privacy Directive, MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING, Dec. 2, 2003, available at 2003 
WLNR 10746524. 
 75 Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 13. 
 76 See id. ¶ 86. 
 77 Hitchens, supra note 72. 
 78 Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 13. 
 79 See id. ¶ 15.  Lindqvist failed to “notify the Datainspektionen . . . the supervisory 
authority for the protection of electronically transmitted data.” Id. ¶ 14; see also Klosek, 
supra note 73; Mark Webber, International Privacy Law Developments, in FIFTH 
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW 2004: NEW DEVELOPMENTS & COMPLIANCE ISSUES 
IN A SECURITY-CONSCIOUS WORLD 313 (PLI 2004). 
 80 Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 15. 
 81 Klosek, supra note 73; see also Webber, supra note 79, at 313. 
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appealed the district court decision.82  The Göta hovrätt, the 
Swedish court of appeals, was unsure of the ramifications of the 
Data Protection Directive and hence the application of European 
Union law on several aspects of the case.  They stayed the 
proceedings and requested guidance from the European Court of 
Justice.83  The Göta hovrätt posed seven questions to the European 
Court of Justice regarding how the meaning of the Directive should 
be interpreted.84  Part II.A of this Comment will consider the 
questions and the associated commentary by those submitting 
briefs and by the court. 
1. On the Issue of “Processing” 
The Göta hovrätt’s first question addressed whether 
mentioning someone on an Internet page falls within the Data 
Protection Directive’s scope, and if so, “[d]oes it constitute the 
processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means to 
list on a self-made internet home page a number of persons with 
comments and statements about their jobs and hobbies.”85  This 
question, regarding the factual meaning of “processing,” greatly 
concerns “third country” data collectors.86  Lindqvist submitted 
that it was “unreasonable” that the “mere mention by name of a 
person or of personal data in a document” would constitute 
processing.87  The Swedish government, conversely, claimed that 
processing under the Data Protection Directive includes “all 
processing in computer format.”88  The Commission of the 
European Communities asserted, “making personal data available 
on the internet constitutes processing wholly or partly by automatic 
means, provided that there are no technical limitations which 
restrict the processing to a purely manual operation.  Thus, by its 
very nature, an Internet page falls within the scope of Directive 
95/46.”89  The relevant article of the Directive, Article 3(1), states 
 
 82 See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 16. 
 83 See Id. ¶ 18; Klosek, supra note 73. 
 84 For a reproduction of the questions posed to the Court, see infra App. 1. 
 85 Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 18(1) (emphasis added). 
 86 Cf. Smith, supra note 26. 
 87 Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 20. 
 88 Id. ¶ 21. 
 89 Id. ¶ 23. 
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that “[t]his Directive shall apply to the processing of personal data 
wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the processing 
otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which form 
part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing 
system.”90  In response to this issue, the ECJ found that: 
the act of referring, on an internet page, to various persons 
and identifying them by name or by other means, for 
instance by giving their telephone number or information 
regarding their working conditions and hobbies, constitutes 
the processing of personal data wholly or partly by 
automatic means within the meaning of Article 3(1) of 
Directive 95/46.91 
2. If Not Processing by Automatic Means . . . 
The second question was only to be addressed if the first 
question was answered in the negative – that is, if the ECJ found 
that the “mention of a person . . . on an internet home page [is] an 
action” outside the scope of the Directive, and if the listing of the 
other church members were not considered to comprise some level 
of processing.92  The Göta hovrätt, in the event the first question 
was answered in the negative, asked the ECJ if the 
act of setting up on an internet home page separate pages 
for about 15 people with links between the pages which 
make it possible to search by first name be considered to 
constitute the processing otherwise than by automatic 
means of personal data which form part of a filing system 
or are intended to form part of a filing system within the 
meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46.93 
This question asks whether the activities in the Lindqvist 
case—if they do not consist of “processing of personal data wholly 
or partly by automatic means”—instead could be considered to fall 
 
 90 Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 3(1), at 39. 
 91 Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 27. 
 92 Id. ¶ 18(1), (2).  Processing in ¶ 18(1) is either “wholly or partly by automotive 
means.” 
 93 Id. ¶ 18(2) (emphasis added). 
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under the filing system component of Article 3(1).94  Because the 
ECJ found that the creation of the Internet pages did fall under the 
scope of the Directive as defined in the first case of Article 3(1), it 
did not address whether or not they fell under the second.95 
Considering, arguendo, that the Court needed to address 
Article 3(1)’s second case, the ECJ might have helped clarify some 
of the ambiguity surrounding the Directive’s scope; the definitions 
section of the Directive gives little true guidance to what would be 
considered a “filing system,” saying merely that a “‘personal data 
filing system’ . . . shall mean any structured set of personal data 
which are accessible according to specific criteria, whether 
centralized, decentralized or dispersed on a functional or 
geographical basis.”96 
3. Did This Activity Fall under One of The Article 3(2) 
Exceptions? 
The next question the European Court of Justice addressed in 
the decision was whether the facts at hand could possibly fall 
under exceptions in Article 3(2) of the Data Protection Directive 
exempting “processing of personal data . . . by a natural person in 
the course of a purely personal or household activity.”97  Lindqvist 
raised the issue of freedom of expression, claiming that those 
“creat[ing] internet pages in the course of a non-profit-making or 
leisure activity are not carrying out an economic activity and are 
thus not subject to Community law.”98  The Court called 
 
 94 Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 3(1), at 39. 
 95 Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2,. ¶ 28. 
 96 Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(c), at 38. 
 97 Id. art. 3(2) at 39: 
This Directive shall not apply to the processing of personal data: 
-  in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Community law, 
such as those provided for by Titles V and VI of the Treaty on European Union 
and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, defence, 
State security (including the economic well-being of the State when the 
processing operation relates to State security matters) and the activities of the 
State in areas of criminal law, 
-  by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. 
Id. 
 98 Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 30. 
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Lindqvist’s activities “charitable and religious,”99 but said that, in 
addition to covering activities of the state (in defense and public 
safety, for example), the exceptions of Article 3 were to be taken 
literally and to apply to the “activities . . . expressly listed there or 
which can be classified in the same category.”100  It held that the 
exceptions did not apply to the “charitable and religious” activities, 
but rather applied to the “exercise of activities which are 
exclusively personal or domestic, correspondence and the holding 
of records of addresses.”101  Moreover, the ECJ held that the 
exception of Article 3 applied to “activities . . . carried out in the 
course of private or family life of individuals”102 and not to 
“publication on the internet so that those data are made accessible 
to an indefinite number of people.”103  The Court said that the 
information Lindqvist published was not within the realm of the 
exceptions.104 
In its comments to the Court, the Commission of the European 
Communities made several interesting arguments, suggesting that 
the interpretation of the exceptions listed in the Directive may be 
the grounds for further discussion.105  The Commission asserted 
that the aim of the Directive was “to regulate the free movement of 
personal data in the exercise not only of an economic activity, but 
also of social activity in the course of the integration and 
functioning of the common market,”106 and that to interpret 
otherwise “might entail serious problems of demarcation,”107 
especially insofar as the possibility of “pages containing personal 
data intended to disparage certain persons with a particular end in 
view might then be excluded from the scope of that directive.”108 
4. Did the Data Concern Health? 
 
 99 Id. ¶ 39. 
 100 See id. ¶ 44. 
 101 Id. ¶ 46. 
 102 Id. ¶ 47. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See id. ¶ 48. 
 105 See id. ¶¶ 30–36. 
 106 Id. ¶ 35. 
 107 Id. ¶ 36. 
 108 Id. 
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The fourth question the Göta hovrätt sent to the EJC was 
whether “reference” to a foot injury and to the fact that the injured 
person was working half-time on medical grounds “constitute[] 
personal data concerning health,” as defined in Article 8(1) of the 
Directive.109  The Court held that information regarding health—
both mental and physical—should be given a “wide 
interpretation,” and that the reference was clearly health 
information under the Directive.110  Article 8 sets forth “special 
categories” of data, namely “personal data revealing racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, 
trade-union membership and the processing of data concerning 
health or sex life.”111 
These types of information are not considered “special” in 
regards to processing, as far as the exceptions laid out in Article 
8(2) are concerned.  These exceptions include: when the person 
has “given . . . explicit consent,”112 in employment law situations 
where allowed by national law and protected by “adequate 
safeguards,”113 when “necessary to protect the vital interests of the 
data subject or of another person where the data subject is 
physically or legally incapable of giving his consent,”114 when the 
data is for legal claims,115 or for “preventive medicine, medical 
diagnosis . . . or the management of health-care services, and 
where those data are processed by a health professional subject 
under national law or rules established by national competent 
bodies to the obligation of professional secrecy.”116  Additionally, 
the Directive explicitly allows for member state utilization of a 
universal identification number in this section.117 
It is interesting to note that the Swedish authorities did not 
raise the question of whether information about the church 
volunteers, by naming them as church volunteers, also violated this 
 
 109 Id. ¶ 49. 
 110 Id. ¶ 50. 
 111 Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 8(1), at 40. 
 112 Id. art. 8(2)(a), at 40. 
 113 Id. art. 8(2)(b), at 40. 
 114 Id. art. 8(2)(c), at 40. 
 115 Id. art. 8(2)(e), at 41. 
 116 Id. art. 8(3), at 41 (emphasis added). 
 117 Id. art. 8(7), at 41. 
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sphere of “special categories” of data in regard to data about 
“religious or philosophical beliefs.”  Among the exceptions for use 
of “special category” information is one allowing for: 
processing . . . in the course of its legitimate activities with 
appropriate guarantees by a . . . non-profit-seeking body 
with a political, philosophical, religious or trade-union aim 
and on condition that the processing relates solely to the 
members of the body or to persons who have regular 
contact with it in connection with its purposes and that the 
data are not disclosed to a third party without the consent of 
the data subjects.118 
The facts of the Lindqvist case clearly indicate that the data 
subjects did not give their consent.119 
5.  Was There a “Transfer” of Data? 
The fifth question referred by the Göta hovrätt addresses the 
meaning of “transfer” under Article 25 of the Directive.120  
“Transfer” is not defined within the Directive, either in the 
definitions section, Article 2, or in Chapter IV on the “Transfer of 
Personal Data to Third Countries.”121  Throughout the body of the 
Directive, however, transfer is used in discussions about moving 
data to third countries.122 
The reference to the EJC specifically asked if there was a 
transfer of data in the construction of a web page, which was then 
stored as part of a site that could be visited by users from other 
 
 118 Id. art. 8(2)(d), at 40–41. 
 119 See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 14. 
 120 See id. ¶ 52. 
 121 Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 2, at 38–39; arts. 25–26, at 45–46. 
 122 The following are examples of instances where transfer is used to describe the 
moving of data to third countries: paragraphs 37 (on freedom of information); 56 (on 
international trade); 57 (on the adequacy of protection in third countries); 58 (on the need 
for exceptions to paragraph 57); 60 (on limiting transfers from member states only to 
third countries that are in compliance with the Directive); 66 (on making the Commission 
responsible for the implementation of a process for implementation of the Directive’s 
components); Article 19 (regarding the notifications required to the member states about 
information being moved); and of course, Chapter IV, titled “Transfer of Personal Data to 
Third Countries” (covering in which cases and under what protections transfers outside of 
the EU can take place).  See id. at 34–37, 44–46. 
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countries (including third countries).123  Additionally, it questioned 
whether the lack of use of the page by third country residents or 
the hosting of the page in a third country would affect the response 
to whether data transfer had taken place.124  In most of the other 
questions posed to the ECJ, the countries and the Commission of 
the European Communities, in submitting commentary, suggested 
reasoning and conclusions very much along the lines of the Court’s 
decisions.125  In their commentary regarding the fifth question, 
however, the Swedish government and the Commission state that 
putting data on the Internet “so that they become accessible to 
nationals of third countries, constitutes a transfer of data to third 
countries” under the Directive, even if there had been no third 
country call to the data.126  The issue of data transfer was the third 
count on which Lindqvist was prosecuted in the lower Swedish 
courts; she “transferred processed personal data to a third country 
without authorization.”127  Transfer is used to discuss moving data 
from one state to another, as opposed to moving or presenting 
information from a server hosting web pages to a user’s computer.  
The Court emphasized this distinction in its response to the 
question.128 
The Court responded that in order to see Lindqvist’s pages, a 
user would have to connect to the Internet and request the pages in 
question,129 but that “Mrs[.] Lindqvist’s internet pages did not 
contain the technical means to send that information automatically 
to people who did not intentionally seek access to those pages.”130  
The Court continued by emphasizing that Chapter IV of the Data 
Protection Directive makes no specific mention of the Internet:131 
 
 123 See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 52. 
 124 See id. 
 125 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 20–27. 
 126 Id. ¶ 53. 
 127 Id. ¶ 15. 
 128 See id. ¶¶ 59–71. 
 129 See id. ¶ 60. 
 130 Id. 
 131 See id. ¶ 67.  “[I]t does not lay down criteria for deciding whether operations carried 
out by hosting providers should be deemed to occur in the place of establishment of the 
service or at its business address or in the place where the computer or computers 
constituting the service’s infrastructure are located.” Id.  Indeed, the term the “Internet” is 
not found anywhere in the body of the Directive. See generally id. 
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one cannot presume that the Community legislature 
intended the expression transfer . . . to a third country to 
cover the loading, by an individual in Mrs Lindqvist’s 
position, of data onto an internet page, even if those data 
are thereby made accessible to persons in third countries 
with the technical means to access them.132 
In its next Recital, the Court held that if transfer were equated 
to publication on the Internet, any publication of personal data on 
the Internet would be a transfer to all Internet-accessing third 
countries.  Further, the Court held that if there were a singular 
Internet-accessing third country without adequate protection, then 
“Member states would be obliged to prevent any personal data 
being placed on the internet.”133 
6. Is Freedom of Expression Abridged? 
The sixth question referred by the Göta hovrätt addressed 
whether, by the application of the Data Protection Directive to 
facts of the Lindqvist case, conflicts arise with freedom of 
expression or other fundamental rights.134  The Court responded 
that the Directive is broad, thus covering many possible situations, 
but that the protection of fundamental freedoms—expression and 
the protection of individual privacy among them—are inherent in 
the text of the Directive.135  The Lindqvist Court urged other courts 
in member states to apply proportionality in future questions and to 
use care so that neither member state law nor the Directive is 
interpreted in a manner that infringes on the freedom of 
expression.136  As in this case “Mrs[.] Lindqvist’s freedom of 
expression in her work preparing people for Communion and her 
freedom to carry out activities contributing to religious life have to 
be weighed against the protection of the private life of the 
 
 132 Id. ¶ 68. 
 133 Id. ¶ 69.  The United States would certainly be considered such a third country. 
 134 See id. ¶ 72. 
 135 See id. ¶¶ 79, 82. 
 136 See id. ¶ 87. 
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individuals about whom Mrs[.] Lindqvist has placed data on her 
internet site.”137 
7. How Much Latitude Does a Member State Have in Privacy 
Legislation? 
The seventh question referred by the Göta hovrätt asked 
whether a member state  could have more restrictions than those 
found within the Directive.138  This question strives to determine if 
the Directive is meant as baseline legislation or as a piece of 
harmonizing legislation.139  The ECJ responded that member states 
may apply national legislation to areas beyond the scope of the 
Directive-based legislation as long as that extension is not 
prohibited by other Community law.140  The ECJ further described 
the Directive’s ambition as “harmonisation which is generally 
complete.”141  Analyzing Recital 10 of the Directive, the ECJ 
responded that the goal of the Directive is equivalence in the laws 
of the member states,142 but that the Directive accords “a margin 
for [Member states to] manoeuvre in certain areas and authorises 
them to maintain or introduce particular rules.”143  The ECJ held 
that legislation “must be consistent both with the provisions of 
Directive 95/46 and with its objective of maintaining a balance 
between freedom of movement of personal data and the protection 
of private life.”144 
B. Does the Decision Offer Guidance or Cause More Confusion? 
Lindqvist did not expect to lose the case.145  “She . . . view[s] 
this as Big Brother gone mad.  She sees this as an infringement of 
 
 137 Id. ¶ 86. 
 138 See id. ¶ 91. 
 139 Id. ¶¶ 91–99.  Once again, the Commission urges a somewhat different take on the 
matter in its comments to the Court: “The Commission therefore submits that a Member 
state cannot make provision for more extensive protection for personal data or a wider 
scope than are required under the directive.” Id. ¶ 94. 
 140 Id. ¶ 99. 
 141 Id. ¶ 96. 
 142 Id. ¶ 95. 
 143 Id. ¶ 97. 
 144 Id. ¶ 99. 
 145 Hitchens, supra note 72. 
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her rights.  She did this for a bit of fun and was hounded by 
parishioners and even the vicar,” her lawyer told the press.146  He 
said that she asked to be prosecuted as a test case.147  The case 
offers an interesting framework for comparison between data 
protection in the United States and European Union.  An action 
such as this would be highly unlikely in the United States without 
at least the perception of harm by some party.148  In the United 
States, the party perceiving harm would seek to remedy that harm, 
generally as an individual with an equity or tort claim.149  In 
contrast, the Lindqvist case emphasizes that the Data Protection 
Directive applies to information about individuals—individually, 
as opposed to large amounts of gathered information about a group 
of individuals—and offers those individuals a right of action.150  
That right of action is carried out on the behalf of the individual 
who claims a misuse of their information.151 
C. What Is a Transfer? 
Lindqvist is the first case on the questions of transfer to third 
country and whether creating Internet pages is, per se, a transfer.152  
 
 146 Id.  Lindqvist’s lawyer, Sture Larsson, said, “She feels like the victim of a medieval 
witchhunt rather than a member of an advanced European society.” Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the 
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 963–64 (1989). 
 149 There are also some cases in which state law could offer protection. See discussion 
infra Part III.B.4. 
 150 See generally Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2.  “Member states shall provide for 
the right of every person to a judicial remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed him 
by the national law applicable to the processing in question.” Data Protection Directive, 
supra note 3, art. 22, at 45. 
1. Member states shall provide that any person who has suffered damage as a 
result of an unlawful processing operation or of any act incompatible with the 
national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive is entitled to receive 
compensation from the controller for the damage suffered. 
2. The controller may be exempted from this liability, in whole or in part, if he 
proves that he is not responsible for the event giving rise to the damage. 
Id. art. 23, at 45. 
 151 Data Protection Directive, supra note 3, art. 28, at 48 (“Each supervisory authority 
shall hear claims lodged by any person, or by an association representing that person, 
concerning the protection of his rights and freedoms in regard to the processing of 
personal data.  The person concerned shall be informed of the outcome of the claim.”). 
 152 Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 69. 
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In Recital 69 of the Lindqvist decision, the response to the question 
of the meaning of data transfer is unambiguous:  
If Article 25 of Directive 95/46 were interpreted to 
mean that there is transfer [of data] to a third country every 
time that personal data are loaded onto an internet page, 
that transfer would necessarily be a transfer to all the third 
countries where there are the technical means needed to 
access the internet.153 
Hence, the implications of defining transfer as such would be 
stupendous and unwieldy.  “[I]f the Commission found  . . .  that 
even one third country did not ensure adequate protection, the 
Member states would be obliged to prevent any personal data 
being placed on the internet,” the decision continues.154  Save the 
Safe Harbor provisions, the United States is considered such a 
third country, thus, it is fair to assume that there would at least be 
one third country with inadequate protection. 
The Court  enunciated, “it must be concluded that Article 25 of 
Directive 95/46 is to be interpreted as meaning that operations such 
as those carried out by Mrs. Lindqvist do not as such constitute a 
transfer [of data] to a third country.”155  But then, what meaning 
does “transfer” have within the Data Protection Directive? 
[T]here is no transfer [of data] to a third country within the 
meaning of Article 25 of Directive 95/46 where an 
individual in a Member state loads personal data onto an 
internet page which is stored with his hosting provider 
which is established in that State or in another Member 
state, thereby making those data accessible to anyone who 
connects to the internet, including people in a third 
country.156 
So a transfer to a third country is not what the facts of the 
Lindqvist case state, nor is it making Internet pages that are hosted 
on servers in one’s own or another European Union member 
 
 153 Id.; see also discussion supra Part I.A.4. 
 154 Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 69 (emphasis added). 
 155 Id. ¶ 70. 
 156 Id. ¶ 71. 
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state.157  This raises, but leaves unanswered, the issue of whether 
transfer takes place when information about EU residents, placed 
there by residents of EU member states, appears on Web pages 
hosted on servers in non-member countries.158 
In the past, content on Web pages hosted in the U.S. has 
received foreign attention.159  If such content included personal 
information about residents, it could, under the possibility raised 
above, draw the attention of the European Court of Justice.  The 
Court has expressed a lack of interest in considering the possible 
access of Internet pages by third country residents;160 this suggests 
 
 157 See id. ¶¶ 69–71. 
 158 See id. ¶ 70 (“It is thus unnecessary to investigate whether an individual from a third 
country has accessed the internet page concerned or whether the server of that hosting 
service is physically in a third country.”).  For a pragmatic discussion of what businesses 
need to do and how they need to approach the Data Protection Directive, see A BUSINESS 
GUIDE TO CHANGES IN EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION 25–124 (1999). 
 159 In November 2000, a French judge, in a widely criticized opinion, told Yahoo! that 
French users had to be prevented from seeing pages on the U.S. version of the auction 
site that sold Nazi war memorabilia and neo-Nazi objects. Timothy D. Casey & Jeff 
Magenau, A Hybrid Model of Self-Regulation and Governmental Regulation of 
Electronic Commerce, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 16–17 (2002).  
If the company did not comply, it would be heavily fined (about $14,000/day). Id.  The 
items had been taken off the French Yahoo! sites. Id. at 17.  French law “strictly prohibits 
the display or sale of objects that incite racial hatred.” See Yahoo!’s French Connection, 
THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 2000, http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm? 
Story_ID=431328 (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).  The dispute has also been heard in U.S. 
courts, as Yahoo! sought declaration that the French ruling did not apply to the U.S. 
versions, but was told by the Ninth Circuit that Yahoo! could not assert a First 
Amendment right until the French organizations sought relief in U.S. courts. See Yahoo!, 
Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 
2004).   
The implications [of the French judge’s decision] for e-commerce jurisdiction 
are significant, as businesses seeking to avoid regulation in a foreign country 
may be forced not only to refrain from purposefully directing prohibited 
content at nationals of the regulating country, but could actually be required to 
install protective measures to prevent nationals from a regulating country, even 
those speaking another language than their native tongue, from accessing a site 
not specifically directed at them. 
Casey & Magenau, supra, at 17. 
 160 See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶¶ 70–71; see also Taylor Wessing, Bodil 
Lindqvist C-101/01, at http://www.taylorwessing.com/topical/intellectual_property/ 
1103_bodil.html (last visited May 5, 2005).  The issue of transfer outside the context of 
Web pages has been an issue before the court, especially in the context of employment 
information being transferred from one office in the European Union to another corporate 
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to interested parties that the Court’s definition of transfer has no 
dependencies on the location of the data from a technological point 
of view, nor is the Court interested in parsing distinctions about 
recipients of the data in the definition of transfer. 
III.  THE LINDQVIST DECISION IS NARROW, INADEQUATE, AND 
MISUNDERSTANDS THE REALITIES OF BUSINESS 
Bodil Lindqvist was a private citizen who built Internet pages 
as homework for a class she was taking.161  She was not involved 
in commerce nor was she collecting large amounts of data about 
individuals.  Indeed, the actions that got her into trouble were 
geared toward enhancing her community and connecting with and 
serving fellow church members.162  When she was asked to take 
down the pages, she acquiesced.163  The facts of the case specify 
neither embarrassment on the part of the subjects of the pages nor 
any harm, economic or otherwise.164  Yet the case came before the 
Swedish data protectors and was escalated.165  The possibility of 
having each and every citizen claim that his or her privacy has 
been compromised by a use of information about him or her 
somewhere on the Internet is a monumental bureaucratic disaster, 
one which is it difficult to imagine was the imagined intent of the 
drafters of the European Union’s Data Protection Directive.166  In 
conclusion, Part III will address some of the breaches of personal 
data outside of the European Union, then review the existing law in 
the United States covering the protection of personal information, 
before concluding that U.S. lawmakers should use the Lindqvist 
 
office, either within or outside the EU.  A discussion of this is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. 
 161 See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 2. 
 162 See id. ¶ 12 (discussing how the original impetus behind Lindqvist’s creation of her 
Web page was to provide information for fellow congregants who would be receiving 
Confirmation). 
 163 Id. ¶ 14 (“She removed the pages in question as soon as she became aware that they 
were not appreciated by some of her colleagues.”); Klosek, supra note 73. 
 164 See Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶¶ 13–14. 
 165 See Klosek, supra note 73. 
 166 Id. “The court’s finding highlights the fact that Europe’s data protection regime is 
extremely far reaching.  The enforcement action that was launched against Lindqvist, and 
validated in large part, by the ECJ, is not likely to be the last of its kind.” Id. 
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case as a warning of the sorts of poor decisions that can result from 
heavy-handed centralized legislation. 
A. Breaches of Personal Information 
The Lindqvist case is an extremely minor exposure of limited 
personal information.  In contrast, breaches of security have 
affected customers of GMAC Insurance,167 Equifax Canada,168 
and, in February 2005, at “data collection giant,” ChoicePoint.169  
San Diego State University and Indiana State University have both 
experienced invasions that have compromised the security of 
employee and student information.170  In all these cases, at least 
thousands of personal records were compromised.171  Less than a 
month after the ChoicePoint compromise, a suit had already been 
filed seeking class status for those whose information was 
involved.172  Compared to these actions, and the resulting potential 
damage to the financial security of those individuals involved, the 
condemnation by the European Court of Justice of Lindqvist’s 
actions appears draconian and abusive. 
The breaches in the United States, and the resulting outcry 
from consumers, have caused politicians to call for more cohesive 
laws governing data protection and punishing companies whose 
data is compromised.173  But U.S, legislators should view the 
 
 167 See George V. Hulme, Breach of Trust, INFORMATIONWEEK, May 3, 2004, at 58.  
GMAC Insurance had two laptops stolen with 200,000 records containing “Social 
Security numbers, home addresses, and credit scores,” while Equifax Canada alerted 
more than 1400 people of a breach. Id.  San Diego State alerted 178,000 about possible 
exposure during hackers’ attack. See id.  Meanwhile, nearly 145,000 people in Choice 
Point’s systems had information including Social Security numbers and addresses passed 
to a con artist. Tom Zeller Jr., Breach Points Up Flaws in Privacy Laws, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 24, 2005, at C1. 
 168 See Hulme, supra note 167. 
 169 Zeller, supra note 167. 
 170 See Hulme, supra note 167. 
 171 GMAC Insurance had two laptops stolen with 200,000 records containing “Social 
Security numbers, home addresses, and credit scores,” while Equifax Canada alerted 
more than 1400 people of a breach. Id. San Diego State alerted 178,000 about possible 
exposure during hackers’ attack. See id.  Meanwhile, nearly 145,000 people in 
ChoicePoint’s systems had information including Social Security numbers and addresses 
passed to a con artist. Zeller, supra note 167. 
 172 Zeller, supra note 167. 
 173 Id. 
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Lindqvist decision as a warning sign in the dangers of broadly 
legislating privacy.  In the aforementioned breaches, the 
individuals whose information was exposed suffered harm, and 
that harm was suffered by more than one person.174  To better 
understand the methods of remediating possible harm, it is first 
important to understand the major laws governing private 
information. 
B. The Range of Privacy Regulations in the U.S. Currently 
The U.S. Department of Commerce itself calls the U.S. 
approach a “sectoral . . . mix of legislation, regulation, and self 
regulation.”175  The legislation includes the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, which addresses the use of credit reports and means for 
resolving disputes by consumers of the information contained 
within them;176 the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, which states 
that motor vehicle agencies cannot release personal information 
about licensees;177 the Privacy Act of 1974, which controls the 
information held on individuals by the government agencies and 
how it may be disclosed;178 legislation on school records; 
workplace privacy laws, where the privacy rights afforded private 
and governmental employees are vastly distinct;179 the law on the 
use of polygraphs;180 and the law governing the disclosure of 
medical information;181 to name just a few.182 
 
 174 Id. 
 175 Safe Harbor Overview, supra note 7.  “The European Union, however, relies on 
comprehensive legislation that, for example, requires creation of government data 
protection agencies, registration of data bases with those agencies, and in some instances 
prior approval before personal data processing may begin.” Id. 
 176 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). 
 177 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000). 
 178 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). 
 179 Workplace privacy rights differ for the approximately three million U.S. federal 
employees and their private sector counterparts. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, 
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 618–19 (2003).  For a more detailed discussion of the 
protections afforded federal employees, see id. at 618–85. 
 180 Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (2000). 
 181 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 210 (2000)). 
 182 For an overview of U.S. federal legislation on privacy, state counterparts, and cases 
involving privacy, see HENDERSON, supra note 14, at 40–85. 
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1. Protecting Children Online 
The federal government has been particularly interested in 
protecting children online by attempting to protect their privacy 
and prohibiting them from seeing inappropriate content.183  COPA 
and COPPA are oft-confused but different pieces of legislation 
with much history.  The Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”)184 
addressed marketing and obscenity that might be seen by 
children.185  The Supreme Court has held, however, that COPA is 
likely unconstitutional in its interference with the protections of the 
First Amendment.186  In contrast, the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (“COPPA”),187 an amendment to the 
Communications Act of 1934, is still viable.188  COPPA, which is 
administered by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), addresses 
the online collection of personally identifiable information about 
children (defined as those under 13).189  It requires parental 
consent and information control when a website targeted to 
children collects personally identifiable information and limits the 
use of cookies and other tracking devices.190 
 
 183 Much has been written about children and the Internet. See, e.g., Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Childproofing the Internet, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 447 (2003); Melanie Hersh, 
Note, Is COPPA a Cop Out?: The Child Online Privacy Protection Act as Proof that 
Parents, Not Government, Should Be Protecting Children’s Interests on the Internet, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1831 (2001). 
 184 47 U.S.C. § 231. 
 185 47 U.S.C. § 231 
Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character of the material, in 
interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any 
communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and that 
includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than 
$50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both. 
Id. 
 186 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783, 2789, 2795 (2004); Krotoszynski, supra note 
183, at 453–55. 
 187 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6501–06 (2000). 
 188 Id. 
 189 15 U.S.C.A. § 6501(1). 
 190 See Facts for Businesses, How to Comply with the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Rule, at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/coppa.htm (last visited 
May 5, 2005). 
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act and Rule apply to individually 
identifiable information about a child that is collected online, such as full name, 
home address, email address, telephone number or any other information that 
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2.  Protection of Health Information 
Health information is generally less protected.  “Our private 
health information [is] being shared, collected, analyzed, and 
stored with fewer federal standards than video store records,” 
reported Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human 
Services under the Clinton administration.191  Some recourse does 
exist for the misuse and inappropriate processing of sensitive 
personal information in the U.S.  The Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)192 was enacted primarily 
so that employees could more easily change jobs without being 
penalized by health insurance companies for pre-existing 
conditions, but it also included provisions for more protection of 
health information.193  Nonetheless, emphasizing Shalala’s point 
above, individuals incur responsibility only when associated with 
official functions in a medical office under HIPAA.194 
3.  Privacy as Consumer Protection 
The FTC also has enforcement powers for privacy violations 
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.195  The FTC’s traditional 
consumer protection role is expanding as it takes an active interest 
 
would allow someone to identify or contact the child. The Act and Rule also 
cover other types of information—for example, hobbies, interests and 
information collected through cookies or other types of tracking mechanisms—
when they are tied to individually identifiable information. 
Id. 
 191 DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE 
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 65 (1998). 
 192 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 210 (2000)). 
 193 See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 179, at 210. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 
U.S.C.).  Gramm-Leach-Bliley broadly covers financial institutions as well as 
brokerages, tax return preparations, financial advising companies, credit counseling and 
others.  See Privacy Initiatives, Financial Privacy: The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, at 
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/index.html (last visited May 5, 2005); see also Mike 
Hatch, Electronic Commerce in the 21st Century: The Privatization of Big Brother: 
Protecting Sensitive Personal Information from Commercial Interests in the 21st 
Century, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457, 1476 (2001). 
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in the prosecution of transgressions.196  Indeed, the agency’s 
website states that “[p]rivacy is a central element of the FTC’s 
consumer protection mission.”197  “The Federal Trade Commission 
is educating consumers and businesses about the importance of 
personal information privacy, including the security of personal 
information.”198  For example, the FTC was involved in a 
controversy after the Internet retailer Toysmart declared 
bankruptcy and ran advertisements offering its database of 
customer information for sale.199  The FTC came to an agreement 
with Toysmart for terms under which it could make the sale, an 
action disputed by the attorneys general of thirty-eight states.200  In 
the end, the issue was moot, as an investor bought the database and 
destroyed the information within.  Even so, the case raised issues 
about the many players with stakes in privacy disputes and data 
ownership.201  It also may be considered an an example  of how the 
“sectoral” approach can work in the United States, where despite 
controversy between them, government officials and the courts 
ended up with a just result. 
As in Europe, personal privacy is a deep-rooted concern.  
There is some irony in the fact that Lindqvist’s actions were 
viewed as “gossipy”202 when one reflects back to the seminal 
Warren and Brandeis treaty on privacy, the adoption of which is 
believed to have been a response to an active press desperate for 
details about society.203  The Warren and Brandeis treaty was 
rooted in concern about “intrusions into individual privacy by 
nineteenth century journalists armed with the latest technological 
innovations.”204  Though technology continually changes (it was 
the increasing use of newspaper photography that made those 
 
 196 See Privacy Initiatives, Introduction, at http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html (last 
visited May 5, 2005). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal 
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 389 (2003). 
 200 See id. at 390. 
 201 See id. 
 202 See supra text accompanying note 77; see also Hitchens, supra note 72. 
 203 Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 
39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 703, 709 (1990). 
 204 Id. at 703. 
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commentators pause),205 the underlying concept of finding a right 
to action in tort remains the staple of law in the United States for 
damage to reputation. 
4.  The Tort of Violating Another’s Privacy 
Though the transfer or processing of data is not regulated in the 
United States,206 a person who violates the privacy of another by 
creating a web page, for instance, could face liability for “the 
resulting harm to the interests of the other,”207 generally under 
state law.208  This invasion of privacy is generally understood to 
mean one of four invasions: “(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the 
seclusion of another, . . . (b) appropriation of the other’s name or 
likeness, . . . (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private 
 
 205 “Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred 
precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make 
good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the 
house-tops.’ “ Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 195 (1890). 
 206 In the United States, with limited exceptions, the processing and transferring of data 
per se is not among those activities that either the state or federal governments monitor.  
In the U.S., Lindqvist would not, either as an individual or a business, have been required 
to register with any entity before creating Web pages or even sending data from her 
location to others.  If she had begun to operate as a business, she could have made the 
determination that she should apply for a privacy seal such BBBOnline (part of the Better 
Business Bureau. See http://www.bbbonline.org (last visited May 5, 2005)), TRUSTe 
(Founded by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, TRUSTe had 1413 websites carrying 
their seal as of Sept. 2004. See http://www.truste.org/about/fact_sheet.php (last visited 
May 5, 2005)) or WebTrust (See http://www.cpawebtrust.org/homepage.htm (last visited 
May 5, 2005).  The WebTrust program is administered by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants).  Or she might decide to join a self-regulating organization 
such as the Direct Marketing Association, which would require her business to follow 
their best practices and offer complaining consumers a forum for their grievances on 
privacy violations.  See http://www.the-dma.org/aboutdma (last visited May 5, 2005).  
And example of sectoral self-monitoring, the DMA has issued a “Privacy Promise” that it 
expects member organizations to follow in addition to business practice guidelines in 
several areas. See Direct Marketing Association Guidelines for Ethical Business Practice, 
at http://www.the-dma.org/guidelines/ethicalguidelines.shtml (last visited May 5, 2005).  
The Direct Marketing Association is the largest trade organization for business involved 
in “direct, database, and interactive global marketing.” See 
http://www.dmaconsumers.org/privacy.html (last visited May 5, 2005). 
 207 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
 208 For information on which forms of information are protected on a state-by-state 
basis, see http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/states.html (last visited May 5, 2005). 
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life, . . . or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a 
false light before the public . . . .”209  In Lindqvist, the veracity of 
the material is not discussed.210  Assuming, arguendo, the 
information printed was not false, the closest tort question would 
be unreasonable publicity,211 which generally requires that the 
publicity be of “a kind that . . . would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.”212 
CONCLUSION 
The Swedish court found Lindqvist guilty of three counts: 
processing personal data by automatic means without notifying the 
authorities, the processing of sensitive personal data, and transfer 
of data to third countries.213  The European Court of Justice said 
Lindqvist had not been guilty of a transfer, but that she was guilty 
of processing and that the data involved included health 
information.214 
Lindqvist was clearly a test case of the Data Protection 
Directive, one that pushes many issues and muddies as much as it 
clarifies.  As Lindqvist’s lawyer stated, “This decision emphasises 
the wide-reaching and indiscriminate nature of the European 
Union’s data protection laws.”215  He’s not alone in thinking that 
the EU rules are short-sighted and may in the end stifle the 
businesses they claim to encourage.  A study commissioned by the 
European Commission and executed by the United Kingdom-based 
 
 209 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
 210 See generally Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2. 
 211 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (“One who gives publicity to a matter 
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his 
privacy.”). 
 212 Id. § 652D(a). 
[A]nyone who is not a hermit must expect and endure the ordinary incidents of 
the community life of which he is a part.  Thus he must expect the more or less 
casual observations of his neighbors as  to what he does, and that his comings 
and goings and his ordinary daily activities, will be described in the press as a 
matter of casual interest to others. 
Id. § 652D cmt. c. 
 213 See discussion supra Part II. 
 214 See generally Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2. See also discussion supra Part II. 
 215 Hitchens, supra note 72. 
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Consumers International casts doubt on the assertion of U.S. data 
protection inadequacy.216  The five-year study of 751 websites in 
the United States and Europe, released in 2001, found that 
“[d]espite tight EU legislation . . . U.S.-based sites tend to set the 
standard for decent privacy policies.”217  It also found that eighty 
percent of European websites surveyed did not comply with EU 
data storage opt-out rules and only about one-third direct users to 
privacy policies, another EU requirement.218  “The evidence is that 
enforcement [of the regulations] is simply not happening.”219  
“When you talk to the national regulators who are supposed to 
make sure the rules are applied, they always complain of a lack of 
funding and a lack of staff for an enormous amount of work.”220  
Meanwhile, in New York, the online arm of lingerie retailer 
Victoria’s Secret agreed to a fine of $50,000 by Attorney General 
Eliot Spitzer for exposing the orders, names, and addresses of more 
than 560 customers.221  “The consumer protection laws of the 
1930s have become the privacy law of the 21st century,” Spitzer 
told the New York Times.222 
And so, in the United States, the debate continues about the 
various approaches: unified federal law on privacy, state laws, and 
the market-driven, self-regulating approach to privacy.  “There 
may soon come a point when a business community will have to 
decide whether it prefers a single comprehensive federal rule, or a 
situation in which a variety of state rules create difficult-to-follow 
mandates,” argued then-FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky in a 2000 
speech in Washington, D.C., questioning the self-regulation of the 
U.S. ecommerce industry.223  From a U.S. business perspective, it 
 
 216 See Ben Vickers, Europe Lags Behind U.S. on Web Privacy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 
2001, at B11I. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. (quoting Anna Fielder, Director of Consumers International in London). 
 220 Id. 
 221 John Schwartz, Victoria’s Secret Reaches a Data Privacy Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 21, 2003, 
at C14. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Glenn R. Simpson, FTC Chief Says E-Commerce Industry Should Reconsider 
Privacy-Rules Stance, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2000, at B3.  Deborah Platt Majoras was 
sworn in on August 16, 2004, as Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission.  For the 
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is difficult to fathom the potential chaos and confusion from a 
national law like the Data Protection Directive. 
The conclusions reached in the Lindqvist case, especially as the 
Web pages she created were not considered to be part of  
“household” activities, are difficult to imagine even amid our 
litigious and highly regulatory-prone U.S. climate; the wide reach 
of the European Court of Justice seems contrary to some forms of 
community building in our open society.  Additionally, the sixth 
question addressed to the ECJ—whether freedom of expression 
would be hindered by finding that Lindqvist violated the 
Directive—it seems possible that the suppression of more 
controversial information or discussion, for example the location 
of radioactive waste sites, the addresses of convicted sex offenders, 
or the salaries of high-level government employees, might have 
been found to violate freedom of expression.  The implications for 
bloggers, the Internet diarists whose commentary increasingly 
finds its way into the mainstream media, are considerable.  But on 
both sides of the Atlantic, it likely will take more cases like the 
Lindqvist decision and more near-misses such as the Toysmart 
settlement before the issues are settled. 
The United States Department of Commerce did a disservice to 
businesses transacting with the residents of the European Union in 
agreeing to the Safe Harbor provisions.  The “self-certification” 
process is effectively meaningless and tedious for the companies 
who attempt it, and allows the flaws of the European Union’s Data 
Protection Directive to find their way into the much more 
responsive and agile system in the United States. 
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http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/majoras.htm (last updated May 9, 2005). 
FLORA 11/21/2005  1:11 PM 
1242 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XV 
 
 
Appendix 1 – Questions sent to the European Court of 
Justice 
Recital 18 of Case 101/01, Criminal proceedings against Bodil 
Lindqvist224 
18. As it had doubts as to the interpretation of the Community 
law applicable in this area, inter alia Directive 95/46, the Göta 
hovrätt decided to stay proceedings and refer the following 
questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling: 
(1) Is the mention of a person—by name or with name and 
telephone number—on an internet home page an action which falls 
within the scope of [Directive 95/46]?  Does it constitute the 
processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means to 
list on a self-made internet home page a number of persons with 
comments and statements about their jobs and hobbies etc.? 
(2) If the answer to the first question is no, can the act of 
setting up on an internet home page separate pages for about 15 
people with links between the pages which make it possible to 
search by first name be considered to constitute the processing 
otherwise than by automatic means of personal data which form 
part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing 
system within the meaning of Article 3(1)? 
If the answer to either of those questions is yes, the hovrätt also 
asks the following questions: 
(3) Can the act of loading information of the type described 
about work colleagues onto a private home page which is none the 
less accessible to anyone who knows its address be regarded as 
outside the scope of [Directive 95/46] on the ground that it is 
covered by one of the exceptions in Article 3(2)? 
(4) Is information on a home page stating that a named 
colleague has injured her foot and is on half-time on medical 
grounds personal data concerning health which, according to 
Article 8(1), may not be processed? 
 
 224 Lindqvist Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 18. 
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(5) [Directive 95/46] prohibits the transfer of personal data to 
third countries in certain cases. If a person in Sweden uses a 
computer to load personal data onto a home page stored on a server 
in Sweden—with the result that personal data become accessible to 
people in third countries—does that constitute a transfer of data to 
a third country within the meaning of the directive?  Would the 
answer be the same even if, as far as known, no one from the third 
country had in fact accessed the data or if the server in question 
was actually physically in a third country? 
(6) Can the provisions of [Directive 95/46], in a case such as 
the above, be regarded as bringing about a restriction which 
conflicts with the general principles of freedom of expression or 
other freedoms and rights, which are applicable within the EU and 
are enshrined in inter alia Article 10 of the European Convention 
on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms? 
Finally, the hovrätt asks the following question: 
(7) Can a Member state, as regards the issues raised in the 
above questions, provide more extensive protection for personal 
data or give it a wider scope than the directive, even if none of the 
circumstances described in Article 13 exists? 
 
 
 
 
 
